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COMMENTS
NEW YORK ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE
DISMISSAL OF TEACHING PERSONNEL
In New York the procedure for the dismissal of teaching personnel is
controlled by the general administrative case law and by the specific provisions
of the State Education Law. This study is designed to provide a guide to the
basic procedural framework that must be followed by boards of education in
dismissing teaching personnel. There will be no attempt to analyze the particular
problems involved in any specific cause for dismissal except where the nature
of the cause directly affects the desirability of the proposed procedure. Teacher
dismissal under Education Law section 3021 (removal of superintendents, teach-
ers and employees for treasonable or seditious acts or utterances) or under
Education Law section 3022 (elimination of subversive persons from the public
school system) will not be dealt with due to the peculiar constitutional problems
involved in these provisions.'
IN GENERAL: TENURE AND THE STATUTORY SCHEME
There is no general provision of the Education Law which controls the
dismissal of teaching personnel in all school districts. The statutory provisions
divide the school districts according to size or the number of teachers employed
and there are specific provisions governing tenure and probation in each of
these types of districts. The following is a list of sections of the Education Law
and the type of district to which they are applicable:
A. Section 2573 applies to city school districts with 125,000 or
more inhabitants. Specifically, it applies to New York, Buffalo, Roch-
ester, Syracuse, Yonkers and Albany.2 Within this section there are
subsections which control procedure in cities with a population of
400,000 or more inhabitants3 and cities with a population of one million
or more inhabitants.4
B. Section 2509 applies to city school districts in cities with a
population of less than 125,000 inhabitants. 5
C. Section 3012 applies to Union Free school districts having a
population of more than 4,500 inhabitants and employing a superin-
tendent of schools. 6
D. Section 3013 applies to school districts employing eight or
more teachers other than city school districts and school districts having
a population of 4,500 or more inhabitants and employing a superintend-
ent of schools.
7
1. For a discussion of these provisions of the N.Y. Educ. Law, see Comment, An Ap-
praisal of Security Legislation in Education in Light of Keyishian: A Proposed Solution,
supra p. 781.
2. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2550.
3. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(6).
4. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(7).
5. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2501.
6. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012 (1).
7. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3013 (1).
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E. Section 3014 applies to boards of co-operative educational
services.8
F. Section 3020 is a short provision of general application provid-
ing that teachers shall not be dismissed except for cause found sufficient
by the Commissioner of Education.
Thus the provisions governing probation and the dismissal of a teacher with
tenure cover all school districts employing eight or more teachers and also cover
the boards of co-operative educational services. In addition to this, there is a
provision which prohibits the dismissal of any teacher9 without sufficient cause.
TEAcHER DismissAL DURING THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD
It is appropriate first to examine the procedure for the dismissal of a teacher
during the probationary period since this area may be dealt with summarily. The
actual period of probation may be from one to five years, the variance due to
statutory provisions for various types of school districts and the discretion vested
in the school boards by statute.10 The services of a teacher may be discontinued
at any time during the probationary period on the recommendation of the
superintendent of schools or district superintendent. The recommendation must
be approved by a majority vote of the board of education."1 At the end of the
probationary period the superintendent, based on competent, efficient and satis-
factory performance, may recommend the appointment of the teacher in a
written report to the board.'2 If, at the end of the probationary period tenure is
not granted, school boards are required to give sixty days notice of this refusal
to the applicant. 13 The dismissal of a teacher during the probationary period is
at the discretion of the school board,14 although the board may act only on the
recommendation of the superintendent.' 5 There is no statutory requirement that
grounds for dismissal be specified 16 or that a hearing be held by the school
board.' 7
DismissAL OF A TEACHER WITH TENURu
Once a teacher has been given tenure, he holds his position as long as he
meets the standard of good behavior and competent and efficient service, and
8. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3014(1).
9. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3020. Thus this general provision covers districts employing less
than eight teachers.
10. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(1), 2573(1) provide for a probation period of not less
than one year and not more than three years to be fixed by the school board.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(1) provides for a probationary period of three years.
N.Y. Educ. Law J§ 3013(1) and 3014(1) provide for a probationary period not to ex-
ceed five years, which is established by the school board.
11. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(1), 2573(1), 3012(1), 3013(1), 3014(1).
12. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(2), 2573(5), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2).
13. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(1), 2573(1), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2).
14. Pinto v. Wynstra, 22 A.D.2d 914, 915, 255 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (2d Dep't 1964);
Matter of Marie Ursula Lehn, 1 N.Y. Dep't of Educ. Rep. 286 (1959).
15. Application of Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 283 App. Div. 376, 128
N.Y.S.2d 155 (3d Dep't 1954).
16. Matter of Ruth Ross, 1 N.Y. Dep't of Educ. Rep. 47, 48 (1958).
17. Bomar v. Cole, 177 Misc. 740, 742, 32 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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may not be dismissed unless the school board follows the prescribed statutory
procedures' 8 as to notice, hearing and cause. The board must also conform these
specific statutory provisions to the requirement of "due process of law" found
in the federal and state constitutions.19 Additionally, the board is bound by the
rules and practices found in New York State administrative case law. The
emphasis of these administrative decisions is on the fairness and objectivity of
the administrative procedure. The Court of Appeals has declared that "the
hearing held by an administrative tribunal acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity may be more or less informal. Technical legal rules of evidence and
procedure may be disregarded. Nevertheless, no essential element of a fair trial
can be dispensed with unless waived."20 The basic aim of these general adminis-
trative case law requirements for a fair hearing is to protect citizens from
arbitrary government action.2' With reference to this general mandate for "fair-
ness," the particular procedural steps in the dismissal of a teacher will be ex-
amined.
INVESTIGATION
The first step taken by the school board in dismissing a teacher is the
investigation of a complaint against a particular individual. All complaints are
filed with the board of education,2 2 either by the superintendent as provided by
statute,2 by the board itself 24 or by private individuals. 25 The time in which
these charges must be brought is governed by statutory provisions which vary
according to the type of school district.2 6 Those complaints or charges, whether
written or oral, originating outside of the school system and made to a single
board member, should be communicated to the entire board and a reply should
be drafted which is non-commital but assures the complainant of an investigation
by the board.27 If the complaint arises out of school activities, an investigation
18. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2573(5), 2509(2), 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2).
19. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 6. See Bender v. Board of Regents
262 App. Div. 627, 30 N.Y.S.2d 779 (3d Dep't 1941), where "due process" was characterized
as "due notice and a full opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal . . . [which
results in] clear and convincing proof of his guilt." Id. at 632, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
20. Hecht. v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 470, 121 N.E.2d 421, 426 (1954).
21. See Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183 (1878); see also Note, 30 St. John's L. Rev. 251
(1956).
22. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3012(3), 3013(3), 3014(3) require written charges to be filed
with the board; sections 2509 and 2573 do not have such a specific requirement.
23. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3012(3), 3013(3), 3014(3).
24. Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 81, 299 N.Y. Supp. 257, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
25. Matter of Broderick, 68 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 28 (1947). (Charges were filed
by the Parent Teachers Association.) ; see also Matter of Joseph D. Errico, 3 N.Y. Dep't of
Educ. Rep. 72, 73 (1963). A survey of the school district members of the Erie County Asso-
ciation of School Boards indicates that supervisors, parents and pupils are the most frequent
source of complaints although there was one reported instance of a complaint brought by
the local police department.
26. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(3-a), 3012(4), 3013(2-a) provide that charges must be
brought within five years unless such conduct constituted a crime when committed. N.Y.
Educ. Law § 2573(8-a) requires charges to be brought in three years unless such conduct
resulted in a conviction for a crime. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3014 has no specific requirement.
27. Rezny, Legal Problems of School Baards, § 4.6, 4.7, in 5 Legal Problems of Edu-
cation Series (1966).
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may be made with comparative ease by the superintendent or other appropriate
school official. 28 When the complaint involves charges arising from outside
activities, however, the difficulty is greatly increased. The teacher may be ques-
tioned, the complainant must be interviewed and the facts alleged by the parties
must be verified. Normally these investigatory functions are performed by the
teacher's immediate supervisor, for example the building principal, or (as is
more often the case) by the superintendent of schools for the district.29 Although
individual members of the school board, with or without the authorization of the
board, may conduct an informal investigation of any charges (which investigation
would not disqualify them from sitting or voting on a later hearing of these
charges), 30 it would be advisable to act in a more formal manner to give reassur-
ance of fairness and impartiality in these quasi-judicial proceedings. 31 While
cex parte" exidence will be discussed later in this study, 32 it is pertinent to point
out that if an individual member of the board investigates such charges and does
not communicate to the board and the parties involved in the adjudication,
his action will undermine the validity of any decision reached by the board.
3
The results of the investigation must be given to the board and to the parties in
order to avoid the possibility that the board's decision may be reversed on
appeal.34 Also, in the interest of impartiality and to insure the absence of the
appearance of bias and prejudice, it is good practice for the board member who
usually conducts the hearing to avoid any participation in the investigation. 8
THE REQUIR.EENT OF NOTICE
If charges have been filed with the school board, or an investigation has led
the board to file charges itself, the accused teacher must be adequately notified
of the hearing at which the validity of those charges will be determined. Although
the specific statutory provision may make no mention of the requirement of
28. E.g., school records may be examined in the case of a complaint of continued, un-
excused absence, or there may be interviews conducted with students, supervisors or sub-
ordinates involved in a complaint of incompetency.
29. A survey of the thirty-three members districts of the Erie County Association
of School Boards indicated that the superintendents normally were responsible for the in-
vestigations of complaints against personnel. (Investigation procedures included interviewing
teachers, parents, pupils and other school board employees.)
30. Kaney v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 190 Misc. 944, 77 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 1054, 81 N.Y.S.2d 168, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 707, 83 N.E. 2d 11 (1948)
(Preliminary investigation does not necessarily preclude a fair hearing or impartial consid-
eration by the administrative agency.).
31. Bender v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627, 30 N.Y.S.2d 779, (1941): "In
the administration of justice it is not only requisite that a tribunal invested with judicial
powers should be honest, unbiased, impartial and disinterested in fact, but equally essential
that all doubt or suspicion to the contrary should be jealously guarded against and elim-
inated." Id. at 631, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
32. Infra p. 823.
33. Annot., 18 AJL.R.2d 553, § 2 (1951).
34. Ibid.
35. See, I Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York [herein-
after cited Benjamin] 77 (1942).
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notice or of the content of such notice,36 it has been held that the accused
teacher must, at least, be notified of the nature of the complaint and the time
and place at which he will be given the opportunity to answer the charges.3 7 The
requirement of notice will be met if the allegations are sufficiently specific, and
are set out in a manner which will allow the person charged to prepare to meet
these allegations at a hearing by the school board.38
CAUSE FOl. DismIssAL
Some statutory provisions specifically enumerate the "causes" or conduct of
teaching personnel which justify dismissal by the school board, 39 while other
provisions leave the possible "causes" for dismissal unspecified 40 The conduct
involved may or may not be related to school activities.41 However, the "cause,"
to be sufficient, must be reasonably related to some action or conduct of the
teacher which renders his services undesirable; it must be a neglect of duty or
evidence of conduct affecting his character or fitness for the position.
42
36. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509, 2573 have no special requirement of notice. N.Y. Educ.
Law §§ 3013(3), 3014(3) do not specify the content of such notice but rather require that a
copy of the charges filed with the school board be served on the person so charged at least
ten days before the date set for the hearing. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(3) has the most detailed
statement of the requirement of notice, it provides in part: "No teacher on tenure shall be
dismissed, however, unless furnished with a written statement, specifying in detail the charge
or charges against said teacher, signed by the proper officer of the board of education and
naming a date and place at which the teacher may appear before the board of education and
answer said charge or charges." This same subsection provides that the hearing is to be held
not less than 20 days nor more than 30 days after notice has been served and that such notice
may be by registered mail to that party's last known address.
37. Matter of Healey, 34 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 449, 451 (1926).
38. Benjamin 77-78: "The essence of quasi-judicial procedure is that each party be
given an adequate opportunity to present his case and to meet the case against him. It is by
this criterion that the adequacy of particular methods of specifying the issues in particular
proceedings should be judged . . . ." See also I Davis, Administrative Law Treatise [herein-
after cited Davis) §§ 8.04, 8.05 (1958); Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 8
(example of other items which it might be appropriate to specify in the notice).
39. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3012(2), 3013(2), 3014(2) list two classes of "cause":
"(a) insubordination, immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher." Generally
this class deals with conduct not necessarily related to school performance.
"(b) inefficiency, incompetency, physical or mental disability or neglect of duty." Gen-
erally this class deals with conduct directly related to school duties and educational perform-
ance.These causes, when specified, are the exclusive reason for dismissal and must be shown
to justify such dismissal. Kobylski v. Agone, 37 Misc. 2d 255, 263, 234 N.Y.S.2d 907, 915
(Sup. Ct.) aff'd, 19 A.D.2d 761, 242 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1962).
40. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(2), 2573(5) leave the possible "causes" for dismissal by the
school board unspecified.
41. There is no precise way to delineate those activities which are related to school
activities and those which are not, though individual cases may fall clearly in one or the
other category. See, e.g., Matter of Fotheringham, 15 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 561 (1930)
(affirming the dismissal of a teacher who was absent without consent) ; Matter of Bronson,
15 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 561 (1930) (affirming the dismissal of a teacher who had a
child born out of wedlock).
42. Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 82, 299 N.Y. Supp. 257, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
Typically courts are vague in their definition of "sufficient cause"; however it can be said
that the conduct involved must be in some way detrimental to the school system. See also
Matter of Mufson, 18 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 393, 399 (1918).
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REQUIREMMNT OF A HEARING
After making the initial determination that there are grounds for a formal
presentation of charges43 the school board, or a committee of its members44
must hold a formal hearing. This hearing must not be a mere formality held to
announce a previously decided decision 45 The statutory provisions contemplate a
formal presentation of the evidence with the accused individual having an op-
portunity to fully reply to these charges.46 The various provisions of the N.Y.
Education Law differ in their specific requirements for the hearing with respect
to such matters as testimony under oath, subpoena power, the right to counsel,
and the compilation of an adequate record. 47 Regarding the subpoena power, it
must be noted that both the agency and the person appearing before it have the
right to subpoena witnesses and records. It must also be remembered that it is
not the duty or privilege of the agency to determine the necessity of the testi-
mony to be given by any witness of the respondent. 48 A subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, for the production of papers, should be issued any time it will
further the inquiry, and such a subpoena may be issued whenever the requested
material bears any reasonable relation to the subject matter of the investigation.40
The teacher charged always has the right to be represented by counsel, 0 regard-
less of whether the statute involved specifically refers to this right. The inherent
right of a citizen to be represented by counsel has received the strongest affirma-
tion by the New York courts.51
43. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2509(3) requires that the board have "probable cause," i.e., such
substance to the allegations that would lead reasonable men to hold a hearing to determine
their validity, before a formal presentation of charges is made and a hearing held. If charges
do not constitute a "prima fade" case-not likely to be true-no hearing by the school board
is required. Matter of Parents Ass'n of Pub. School 131, 75 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 152,
153 (1954). N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2573, 3012, 3013, 3014 do not specifically require a determi-
nation of "probable cause."
44. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2509(3), 2573(8), 3013(3), 3014(3) provide for a hearing by
the board or a committee of its members. However, N.Y. Educ. Law § 3012(3) makes no
allowance for a hearing by a committee of the school board and N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(7),
applicable to cities with a population of 1,000,000 or more, contains a provision for the discre-
tionary appointment of a trial examiner by the board. In each of these provisions it is speci-
fied that the board is not bound by the decision of the committee or examiner and, after
having read the testimony and evidence, may accept, modify or reject their findings.
45. Cooke v. Dodge, 164 Misc. 78, 81, 299 N.Y. Supp. 257, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
46. Matter of Kenney, 64 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 209, 210 (1942).
47. See Appendix for the variations in the statutes.
48. Coney Island Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Baldwin, 243 App. Div. 178, 276 N.Y. Supp. 682
(3d Dep't 1935): "The privilege of a litigant to enforce the attendance of witnesses is an
ancient right and should not be denied by prejudging the materiality of the testimony which
may be given .... The issuance of a subpoena is a matter of right and not a matter where
the discretion of a judge or clerk may be exercised." Id. at 180, 276 N.Y. Supp. at 684.
49. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 169 Misc. 144,
7 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
50. Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952); see also Greenbaum v.
Bingham, 201 N.Y. 343, 94 N.E. 853 (1911). Of course, this does not mean that the proceed-
ings are invalid if the person charged does not avail himself of this privilege.
51. 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law 329 (1965).
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RESIGNATION BEFORE OR DURING THE HEARING
The resignation of a teacher with tenure, facing an administrative proceed-
ing on charges filed with the school board, is an accepted avenue of teacher
disciplineY2 The Commissioner of Education has ruled53 that the board of educa-
tion has the power to accept or reject a resignation, 54 and that once the resigna-
tion has been accepted by the board, the teacher may not withdraw it without the
board's consent. In the same ruling the Commissioner declared that a resignation
requested by the board, in order to discontinue disciplinary proceedings, was not
made under duress.55 In another instance, a teacher, faced with various charges,
submitted an irrevocable resignation and the proceedings were dropped "without
prejudice." On appeal, a lower court order that the resignation be vacated and
that the petitioner be given a hearing, was reversed by the Appellate Division.
The court upheld the resignation and declared that the proper interpretation of
the term "without prejudice" was that the charges would be dropped without
imputation of wrongful behavior.56 However, it must be remembered that though
a resignation may be inferred from behavior, it must be an intentional, deliberate
and voluntary act; mere absence, without more, may not be sufficient evidence
of an intent to resign.
57
CONDUCT OF THE HEARING
Prior to the formal hearing, the school board may suspend the accused
teacher.58 The suspension may be for a limited time only. Should the teacher be
reinstated after the hearing, he must be paid in full for the period of suspen-
sion.5 9 The time and place of the hearing should be convenient for all the parties
involved,10 and should normally be a closed meeting, unless the teacher being
charged wishes otherwise, in order to avoid damaging the reputation of that
52. A survey of the member school districts of the Erie County Association of School
Boards indicated that those districts replying considered the resignation of teaching personnel
facing charges was the most desirable avenue of teacher discipline. Only two districts reported
complaints which reached the formal hearing stage. One of these districts reported two persons
were requested to resign for "moral reasons" and then went on to say: "These problems have
never reached the formal hearing and I surely hope that they never do." Questionnaire on file
at the office of the Buffalo Law Review.
53. Matter of Palmer, 49 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 75 (1934).
54. This power is subject to an appeal to the Commissioner of Education; see N.Y.
Educ. Law § 310.
55. Matter of Palmer, 49 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 75, 79 (1934).
56. McFerron v. Board of Educ. of Colonie Cent. Schools, 21 A-D.2d 944, 251 N.Y.S.2d
48 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 630, 255 N.Y.S.2d 674, 203 N.E.2d 924 (1964).
57. Matter of Lelia Johnson, 3 N.Y. Dep't of Educ. Rep. 186, 187 (1964).
58. The Education Law, specifically or impliedly, authorizes the suspension of a
teacher after the charges have been brought until a determination of the matter has been made.
N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(3), 2573(8) authorize such suspension by calling for payment of
back wages if the teacher is re-instated or acquitted. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(7) calls for a
period of suspension at the discretion of the board of not more than ninety days. N.Y. Educ.
Law §§ 3012(3), 3013(3), 3014(3) authorize a suspension of the teacher of not more than
thirty days.
59. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(3), 2573(7), (8), 3012(3), 3013(3), 3014(3).
60. Benjamin 124.
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person 1 The actual physical setting of the hearing room should reflect an
attempt to preserve the formality of the proceeding; 02 of course this latter
requirement is limited by the availability of facilities.63
One of the indispensable requisites of a fair hearing is the right of the re-
spondent to cross examine witnesses and produce witnesses and evidence to refute
the charges against him.6 4 This right of cross examination is limited, at least to
the extent that the stringent requirements of a criminal proceeding need not be
met, and special circumstances such as the need for the testimony of children of
tender years would justify the school board in controlling and limiting the ex-
amination.65 However, it should be remembered that the lack of opportunity to
cross examine a witness weakens the probative value of such testimony when
it is being considered by a reviewing court.66
Technical rules of evidence need not apply to an administrative hearing;("
for example, hearsay testimony is admitted in a number of circumstances.68 The
trend at both the state and federal levels is to make technical evidentiary rules
inapplicable to administrative tribunals.0 9 The Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act section nine provides: "Agencies may admit and give probative effect
to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." In New York it has been said
that the spirit rather than the letter of judicial rules of evidence applies to
proceedings before administrative tribunals.70
CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING
It is difficult to say what amount of evidence is sufficient to sustain the
charges made by the school board, thereby justifying the dismissal of a teacher,
since there is a paucity of decisions under the Education Law regarding what is
"sufficient evidence." The burden of proof, of course, is on those attempting to
dismiss the teacher or alleging the misconduct.71 The courts speak of a "fair
preponderance of the evidence" in order to justify the dismissal of a teacher by
61. Benjamin 126.
62. Benjamin 125.
63. See Davis § 8.13 on hearing procedure and methods.
64. 1 Cooper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 361.
65. Shields v. Hults, 21 A.D.2d 745, 250 N.Y.S.2d 143 (4th Dep't 1964): In the absence
of a "compelling reason to the contrary" petitioner has a right to be confronted by the wit-
nesses who presented proof against him. Id. at 746, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 144. For an interesting
discussion of the problems of children's testimony, see Stafford, The Child As a Witness, 37
Wash. L. Rev. 303 (1962).
66. Benjamin 199.
67. Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
68. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). However, in
view of the nature of the action, hearsay and other incompetent testimony should be severely
restricted. Benjamin 178. No definite guidelines can be given as to when such testimony should
be rejected, the provision as to the judgment of "reasonable" men as found in the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act § 9 is the best available guideline.
69. 2 Davis § 14.06.
70. Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751 (1939).
71. Matter of Cawston, 71 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 48, 49 (1951). See also Matter of
Sharp, 40 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 33, 34 (1930).
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the board.72 It should be noted that although the technical rules of evidence do
not apply to administrative proceedings, and although hearsay and other "in-
competent" evidence may be admitted, there must be some other competent
evidence which establishes the facts alleged and from which reasonable inferences
may be drawn.73 Briefly, the courts will insist that the school board make a
conscientous, painstaking and open-minded analysis of the evidence and draw a
reasonable conclusion therefrom.7 4 Thus, no finding of an administrative agency
can be sustained if it is based solely on suspicion, speculation, surmise and
guesswork."8 There must be substantial evidence to support the findings, i.e.,
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." 7"
The school board's decision to dismiss a teacher can only be based on
evidence introduced in a hearing at which the respondent had an opportunity to
rebut that evidence.7" The principle that an administrative tribunal cannot base
its decision on material not in the hearing record has a long history in New
York. 78 The courts enforce this rule by precluding administrative reliance on
such evidence as affidavits or testimony taken in the absence of the interested
parties, or the school record of the individual or facts gathered from the agency's
own investigation which are not in the transcript or record."9
The various statutory provisions of the New York Education Law call for a
majority vote by the school board before a penalty is imposed and some of
these provisions also list the possible penalties. 80 Though the method of discipline
normally is chosen by the board, occasionally the courts have overruled the
board if the penalty was found to be too harsh or not to fit the offense l
APPEAL AND REviEW
After reaching a decision the school board must state the cause for dismissal
and the specific evidence in the record on which it relied to support its findings.
Intelligent appellate review of the board's determination is impossible unless
72. Matter of Morton, 30 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 9, 11 (1939) ; Matter of Anne Healy,
20 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 193, 195 (1919). See also Matter of Brown, 57 N.Y. Dep't of
State Rep. 332 (1937) (held testimony of numerous superiors sufficient).
73. International Ry. v. Boland, 169 Misc. 926, 928, 8 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
74. Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1st Dep't
1966).
75. Monachino v. State Liquor Authority, 12 Misc. 2d 666, 180 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup.
Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 A.D.2d 378, 178 N.Y.S.2d 22 (4th Dep't 1958).
76. Kilgus v. Board of Estimate of City of New York, 308 N.Y. 620, 627, 127 N.E.2d
705, 710 (1955).
77. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 555 (1951).
78. People ex rel. Kierbrick v. Roosevelt, 1 App. Div. 577, 37 N.Y. Supp. 488 (1st Dep't
1896).
79. Day v. Board of Regents, 266 App. Div. 888, 42 N.Y.S.2d 803 (3d Dep't 1943);
Revere Ass'n v. Finkelstein, 274 App. Div. 440, 84 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1st Dep't 1948).
80. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(3), 3013(3), 3014(3), 2573(7) list the possible penalties
as follows: a fine, a reprimand, a suspension for a fixed period without pay, or dismissal. N.Y.
Educ. Law §§ 2573(8), 3012 do not list any penalties.
81. Tessier v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 5, 24 A.D.2d 484, 260
N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dep't 1965). See also Matter of Louise Lehr, 72 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep.
129 (1952).
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such written findings are made.82 The absence of a declaration of the grounds
for the determination would place an unreasonable burden on the dismissed
teacher in preparing his challenge of the determination and would impede the
court's review.8 3 Findings must be sufficiently specific to enable a reviewing
court to test the sufficiency of the evidence-to determine whether it is of such
substance as will support the determination.
84
An appeal to the Commissioner of Education or to the courts by a dismissed
teacher is allowed under all of the various provisions of the Education Law.85
An appeal to the Commissioner of Education is provided for under Education
Law section 310. It has been held that his decision, once made, is final unless
it can be shown he acted in a purely arbitrary manner,8 6 or that he based his
decision on a mistaken interpretation of the state statute or constitution. 7 The
respondent teacher is not required to first appeal to the Commissioner of Educa-
tion before he may appeal to the courts; rather, he has the option to appeal either
to the Commissioner of Education or to the courts. 8 The procedure for an
appeal to the Department of Education is left to the Commissioner under Educa-
tion Law section 311.89 If the petitioner has previously appealed the decision
of the school board to the courts, the Commissioner will not entertain an appeal
which would alter the court's decision.90 An appeal may be dismissed if it is
taken before there is a final decision at the lower level.9 1 However, in the case
of a dismissal, a petition for review must be presented in the time alloted by
the Education Department rules of procedure. If it is not presented within
the specified time it will be barred by laches from appeal to the Commissioner
unless sufficient cause for the delay is alleged 92 Once the decision of the Com-
missioner has been announced there must be a showing of new material evidence
82. State Liquor Authority v. Patin, 23 Misc. 2d 525, 199 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
83. Carroll v. Huckle, 274 App. Div. 1024, 86 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1948).
84. Di Orio v. Murphy, 20 A.D.2d 754, 247 N.Y.S.2d 417 (4th Dep't 1964).
85. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2509(2), 2573(5), 3012(4), 3013(4), 3014(4). The requirements
of these provisions are uniform. For example, see N.Y. Educ. Law § 2509(2) which provides
in part:
Any person conceiving himself aggrieved may review the determination of said
board either by an appeal to the commissioner of education, or as provided in article
seven of this chapter or in accordance with article seventy-eight of the civil practice
act. If such person elects to institute a proceeding under the civil practice act the
determination of such board, for the purpose of such proceeding, shall be deemed
final.
(References to the Civil Practice Act are now to N.Y. CPLR art. 78: see N.Y. CPLR
§ 7801.)
86. Birmingham v. Commissioner of Educ., 48 Misc. 2d 1052, 1053, 266 N.Y.S.2d 700,
702 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
87. Abramson v. Commissioner of Educ., 1 A.D.2d 355, 150 N.Y.S.2d 250, motion for
rehearing denied, 2 A.D.2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 426 (3d Dep't 1956).
88. Council v. Donovan, 40 Misc. 2d 744, 748, 244 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
see also note 84 supra.
89. See Abramson v. Commissioner of Educ., 1 A.D.2d 366, 150 N.Y.S.2d 270 (3d Dep't
1956), motion for rehearing denied, 2 A.D.2d 612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 426 (3d Dep't 1956).
90. Matter of Haskell-Gilroy, Inc., 1 N.Y. Dep't of Educ. Rep. 463, 464 (1960).
91. Matter of New Rochelle, 70 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 123, 125 (1949).
92. Matter of Shoonmaker, 30 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 219, 222 (1923).
824
COMMENTS
or that the original decision was rendered under a misapprehension of the material
facts, for an appeal to be reopened.9 3
CONCLUSION
The following are suggested procedural steps in the dismissal of teaching
personnel.
In notifying a teacher of charges placed against him, the important ele-
ment is specificity. State the time, place and nature of the incidents which have
led to the inquiry. If school records are to be presented at the hearing by the
board, they should be specifically identified. There is no danger that the board
will be strictly held to these specifications. Administrative agencies are not held
to technical procedural rules, and if some further incident or charge is brought
to light at the hearing it will not violate the individual's right to be notified
of the charges against him. However, it might be advisable to give that person
additional time, should new charges be brought up at the hearing.
It is also advisable that the notice inform the person charged of his right to
be accompanied by counsel, his right to produce evidence, and his right to bring
witnesses before the board.
The time set for the hearing should not be rigidly adhered to, since it
may be in the interest of a fair hearing that the teacher be allowed additional time
to prepare his defense.
In order to give the appearance, as well as the actual fact, of a fair hearing,
the board should separate the functions of the people who investigate, prosecute,
and decide the case. It might be suggested that the superintendent of the school
system or chief school officer be charged with the investigation and the presenta-
tion of the charges against the individual.
The attorney for the school district should always be present at disciplinary
hearings. Informal procedural practices suggested by the school attorney will help
to expedite the hearing and insure a fair and objective inquiry.
Though strict evidentiary rules are not requisites of a fair hearing, the
board should remember that it is "building a record" which may be reviewed
by the courts. Documents and school records referred to or used should be
specifically cited so that the reference may be noted in the record of the hear-
ing, and the accused may examine the material. It would also be advisable for
the board to attempt to corroborate, as far as possible, hearsay and other "in-
formal evidence" presented to it.
When the board reaches a decision, it is required that this decision be
supported by findings. The hearing record should be examined and the reasons
for the dismissal of the teacher be supported by findings as to all pertinent facts
appearing in the record. If new information or material comes to the attention
of the board after the hearing it should re-open the case, notify the teacher of the
additional evidence and hold another hearing. This is advisable even if the
93. Matter of Katzowitz, 76 N.Y. Dep't of State Rep. 69, 70 (1955).
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original record was sufficient, in the board's estimation, to substantiate the
charges. Spending a little extra time will eliminate any possibility of an accusa-
tion that the board used "ex parte" evidence or that the defendant's rights were
prejudiced by evidence which he had no opportunity to refute. This accusation,
if sustained, would be fatal to the board's determination.
There is one other possible suggestion that generally covers all of the pro-
cedural steps taken by the school board in the discipline of teaching personnel.
The school board should act in a formal manner; formality fosters a more com-
plete and precise inquiry which should lead to a more accurate determination.
Finally, it must be noted that the principle object of the provisions of the
Education Law and the object of the courts in setting minimum procedural
standards for administrative tribunals is to insure the respondent teacher a fair
hearing. This objective will be reached if the school board follows a procedure
designed to allow the accused individual every opportunity to present his case
and which allows the board every opportunity for due consideration of the merits
of the case.
JAMES VAN DE WATER
APPENDIX
The following table is a compilation of the differences as to the specific
requirements of a hearing in the various statutes:
Subpoena Option for
power Testimony Transcript Right Public or
Education Under or to Private
Law Records Individuals Oath Record Counsel Hearing
§2509 X x x 0 0 0
§ 2573 * x x 0 0 0
§ 3012 0 0 x x x x
§ 3013 0 x x x 0 0
§3014 0 x x x x 0
Specifically referred to = x
No specific reference = 0
* Education Law § 2573(8) makes no mention of the board's power to subpoena rec-
ords while such provision is made in sub-section (7) applying to cities with a population
of one million or more.
